The interview is easing towards its natural conclusion. We have discussed the impact and the implications of Brexit, and its profound effect upon the tone, dynamic and future of Anglo-Irish relations. We have discussed the complexities, both positive and negative, of unfettered, unchallenged European integration, and the economic and political implications of what a post-Brexit Europe could mean for Ireland.

Throughout it all, Simon Coveney has been precisely on message and decidedly on point. This is hardly surprising, given that that Coveney’s deft handling of Brexit has won him respect both at home and across Europe. As both Tánaiste and Minister for Foreign Affairs, he has been, when required, highly critical of the British political parlour games, while also remaining diplomatic.

Now, however, the conversation has moved to political philosophy, and Coveney’s response is both informing and informative. Coveney, regarded by most as a quintessential centre right politician with a strong streak of social conservatism, says that he no longer believes in the traditional political divide of left and right.

“I don’t really believe in the left/right divide anymore,” he says. “On social issues, I think I’ve become more liberal than maybe I was initially. I’ve always been pretty liberal on immigration. I’ve become more liberal on certain social issues. In terms of economics, I think I’ve always been categorised as kind of centre/centre right.”

Coveney says he views have become more nuanced and more refined. Some of this, he says, stems from his time as housing minister where he witnessed the requirement of direct state intervention and the human impact of homelessness.

“I believe in equal opportunity, but I also believe in responsibility and rewarding talent and effort and having an enterprise-based economy that really rewards and encourages entrepreneurship. I think sometimes state involvement can hold that back,” he says.

“But also, and this particularly changed during my period as a housing minister and a planning minister, I think there is a need for state involvement in strategic change in a country. If you look at the last boom in Ireland, how the construction sector and housebuilding sector developed and grew in a largely uncontrolled way – where developments happened where developers chose or could afford to buy land – I think we built a very unsustainable both economy and society quite frankly.

“The idea that close to 10,000 people drive on their own to work from Portlaoise each day into Dublin – surely we’re brighter than that as a country. We need to create a much more sustainable way of life here. For environmental reasons, for climate reasons but also for quality of life reasons. There is a need for state influence and intervention in a way that can complement and redirect, if you like, the private sector and commercial decisions.”

Given his background and his Fine Gael lineage, it is a subtle, yet interesting, political metamorphosis. And this is something that Coveney himself accepts. However, his says his political philosophies have simply changed.

“I’m a strange mix of things,” Coveney tell me. “In some areas I think I’d be considered left of centre and in other areas I am centre right.”

*****

The entrance to the Department of Foreign Affairs is almost Soviet in its construct, and bears none of the splendour one might associate with the world of high-level diplomacy. The lobby is sparse and utterly functional – two seats, a small table and a security guard sitting behind a glass screen. Occasionally, a door opens to allow a civil servant to enter or to leave.  

When a formal delegation from another country arrives, the department opens up another entry route – one that has the chandeliers, the portraits and the wood panelled walls. For most visitors, however, entry consists of this austere meeting room.

However, once you get past this grim entrance, Iveagh House is simply spectacular, and the minister’s office is quite beautiful. There is the large desk with the ‘in tray’ and the ‘out tray’. There is the ornate fittings, the soft couches and the boardroom table. His office overlooks a private garden for the department, a garden that once housed a boatyard for members of the Guinness family.

Unlike other ministers, Coveney has not brought in his own artwork or sought to model the office to his own taste. Personal mementos are at a minimum. There is a professional feel to the office. I suspect if Coveney moved department tomorrow, he could carry out his personal effects in a small box.

In person, Coveney is considered. He pauses after I ask each question, before delivering his answer. He speaks without notes and did not seek a list of topics or questions in advance.

His profile has increased significantly over the last two years as a consequence of his portfolio, and his elevation to Tánaiste (following his defeat to Leo Varadkar in the election for leader of Fine Gael). The Department of Foreign Affairs is usually a prestigious landing spot for politicians, with an abundance of foreign trips and photo-ops and a distinct lack of controversy. The impending departure of Britain from Europe has altered all of that, and Coveney is now Ireland’s point man on the biggest political issue of this generation.

Brexit has changed both the nature of the role, but also the nature of Anglo-Irish relations. It has enhanced relations between Ireland and the continent, but it has also strained relations between Ireland its closest neighbour. It is here where we start the interview.

Ian Kehoe (IK): The relationship between Ireland and Britain at the moment appears to be at a low ebb. Going forward, how do we rehabilitate that relationship? What needs be done? How do you assess the situation?

Simon Coveney (SC): First of all, I see it through two lenses really. One is the political challenges that we have faced with consecutive governments now in the UK for the last three years in the context of trying to get a fair and sensible Brexit deal that protects Irish interests but also respects the British decision to leave. And the second lens I look through is my own personal story which in many ways is a product of the Anglo-Irish relationship.

My mother had a British passport for most of her life. Some of her family are the most English people I know. Some of them are the most Irish people I know too. It’s a real split English/Irish family. I’m one of seven children. A number of us have developed our careers in the UK. I’ve been to university there. Patrick, my older brother, was in Oxford and I was in university in the west country. I worked in Scotland. So, like a lot of families, I’m a product of, and have been hugely shaped by and influenced by, the British/Irish relationship in a positive way.

So, it’s not comfortable territory for me or for Leo Varadkar or for Pascal Donohoe – both of those personalities are also very much shaped by the British/Irish relationship in terms of their own personal stories and careers and families.

But in some ways, I think that has allowed us to speak to Britain with a sense that we have an argument that is valid and fair and that this is an equal relationship and that Irish concerns need to be understood and heard in this process. I sometimes feel in the past there has been a sort of a deference to the UK in Ireland. And I think, I certainly hope, the generation of political leaders that are now running Ireland, while they have a respect for the UK, they see any negotiation that involves Ireland and the UK and others as a relationship where Irish perspectives are just as important and just as valid as British ones.

“We have to find solutions to Brexit that accommodates that contradiction. And I think we have, by and large.”

IK: So, it is a more mature relationship now between Ireland and the UK?

SC: I hope it’s mature. But I think it certainly isn’t one of responding to the concerns around being offside with Britain and instead it is concerned with the facts that we’re confronted by and the solutions that need to be put in place to recognise those facts. The truth here is that the decision of the United Kingdom to leave the European Union is a hugely complex challenge for Ireland, for the island of Ireland as a whole – North and South.

It potentially undermines the basis for the Good Friday Agreement, which was designed around the assumption of joint EU membership in terms of border management, trade standards, North-South co-operation and so on. John Bruton put it really well when he said what the Good Friday Agreement was about convergence. It left the issue of constitutional change, in the future, up to the people to decide through referendum. But, in the meantime, it was about convergence.

It was about removing borders and barriers, allowing Irish people to feel Irish in Northern Ireland and connected to the rest of Ireland but also allowing British people to remain as part of the United Kingdom. And while the Good Friday Agreement is all about convergence, in terms of structure and politics, Brexit is all about divergence. And so, they are in conflict with each other. We have to find solutions to Brexit that accommodates that contradiction. And I think we have, by and large. And we’ve managed to negotiate deals with two consecutive British governments – under Theresa May, which essentially put in place UK wide solutions, and under Boris Johnson, which has put in place Northern Ireland specific solutions in the context of the withdrawal agreement.

I think that the work we’ve done from the very outset, post the Brexit vote, has reflected the seriousness of this challenge. I’m not sure that the UK has really taken that challenge seriously until the last 12 months or so. When they realised actually that ‘the Irish problem’ was not going to be solved by pressure and political lobbying in European capitals but instead actually addressing the real concerns and facts that we’re confronted with, with solutions that are challenging politically.

“The Brexit secretary has never had a particularly central role. It’s the prime minister’s office has been the central role.”

IK: Let’s talk about that breakthrough. Should we read something into the fact that up until then, the negotiations have been between the European Commission or Europe and the United Kingdom. And then the breakthrough comes with kind of a bilateral conversation between Ireland and Boris Johnson?

SC: The truth is that there’s been a bilateral conversation going on for certainly two years, not a bilateral negotiation though. So, my relationship with people like David Lidington, Pascal Donohoe’s relationship with Philip Hammond, Leo’s relationship with Theresa May and now Boris Johnson, although they are two very different types of personality, I think that there has been a constant exploring of concepts here on a bilateral basis through political conversation on what might work and what might not work politically. And from a practical perspective. And Michel Barnier has very much been part of that conversation on a bilateral basis with Ireland too.

We’ve had a constant dialogue between the Taoiseach’s office and Michel Barnier’s team and between my office and Michel Barnier – both in Dublin and in Brussels. So, there’s been a probing and an exploring of concepts which Ireland has been central to. Looking at ways in which we can deal with this conundrum of how do we protect the peace process, how do we respect Northern Ireland’s constitutional place in the United Kingdom while at the same time recognising that Northern Ireland is fundamentally different to the rest of the United Kingdom and therefore needs a special solution in in the context of avoiding border infrastructure re-emerging.

“I have never had any other minister look to try to trade the solidarity that they’ve given on Brexit for an Irish acceptance of something that we’re not comfortable with.”

IK: Was that the trigger to getting some sort of agreement? The Germans were getting nervous and a bit more agitated and there was a lot of chat in Brussels. But was it the fact that one could talk directly to Boris Johnson not to the Brexit secretary in this particular instance?

SC: Well, in truth, the Brexit secretary has never had a particularly central role. It’s the prime minister’s office which has had the central role. So, initially it was David Davis. Then it was Dominic Raab. Now it’s Steve Barclay. I think they’ve all been Brexit secretaries that really have primarily been managing the Brexit debate in Westminster in committees. They have, every now and again, gone and met Michel Barnier and his team but not particularly often. But the real dialogue between the UK and the EU and Dublin was through the prime minister’s office.

At times the vehicle for that dialogue for me was David Lidington, who was essentially deputy prime minister to Theresa May. Since the change of prime minister, the conversation has been between the Taoiseach’s office and the prime minister’s office to a certain extent. I have a good relationship with Steve Barclay. I have a reasonably good relationship with Dominic Raab too. But those conversations weren’t the dynamic ones that led to a breakthrough. It was, I think, the conversations from Prime Minister to Taoiseach, the conversations with myself and Michel Barnier, and obviously the Taoiseach and myself, which is a constant conversation on Brexit, that led to that trip to the UK when Boris Johnson and Leo Varadkar accepted that there needed to be a solution here. And both of them agreed to an approach that could find that solution. And I think that led to an acceleration then in Brussels of testing that approach to see if it could work and essentially shaping it and designing it in a way that would stand up to scrutiny.

“This is a way of showing that small countries matter in the European Union and that when they’re threatened, when they’re exposed, when they’re vulnerable, collective solidarity is really important.”

IK: What has been striking is the level of solidarity amid the EU 27. Is there a concern that we will have to pay a price for that in the form of tax reform or anything?

SC: People say that to me all the time. I think it’s true that often ministers would say our solidarity on Brexit is absolute and you need not worry, Ireland will not be abandoned here. And I think that has proven to be so. But they sort of jokingly say ‘well don’t ever expect this kind of solidarity on anything else again’. And they say that with a smile. But I can honestly say, and I know Paschal Donohoe will say this, I have never had any other minister look to try to trade the solidarity that they’ve given on Brexit for an Irish acceptance of something that we’re not comfortable with. Taxation is obviously the one that’s mentioned all the time.

I don’t believe that there’s been any correlation between discussion and debates on taxation and taxation reform and Brexit solidarity. That is a very active debate. It has been for decades actually. I remember when I was in the European Parliament, I think about 2005, a very intensive debate on corporate tax and pressure on Ireland. But I can honestly say that there’s been no pressure on the Taoiseach, Paschal Donohoe or myself to actually concede on certain things in return for maintaining solidarity on Brexit.

They really have separated the two issues. I think there are a number of agendas on Brexit in terms of solidarity. First of all, the fact that Ireland is staying and the UK is leaving and that Ireland is seen to have responded in a way that accepts the need to protect EU interests in the context of Brexit has led to a natural inclination for other member states to say we need to support the interests of a country that is staying over the interests of a country that is leaving.

But I think it’s actually a bit deeper than that. I think particularly for Germany and France, this is a way of showing that small countries matter in the European Union and that when they’re threatened, when they’re exposed, when they’re vulnerable, collective solidarity is really important. And you know in five or 10 years’ time, it could be Estonia or Latvia or it could be Cyprus or Malta and those countries now see how Ireland has been protected in the context of EU solidarity and they see themselves in the mirror in the context of future threats and concerns that they may have. And I think that is why Brexit in some ways has been an example of how large influential countries can back the interests of a small country because of membership of the union. Brexit is a really good example of that.

“I think the next five years for the European Union is going to be a very challenging one to actually reinforce solidarity and unity.”

IK: Do you think it might have also masked the lack of reform? Certainly, in the aftermath of the Brexit vote, there was an awful lot of talk about how Europe needs to look at itself. There was a reason Britain left. We haven’t really had those conversations.

SC: I think that’s fair actually. And I think there is a need for more blunt and honest conversation around why Britain is leaving, why there is Euroscepticism across the European Union. I think it’s not likely that other countries are going to want to follow Britain out because they’ve seen how difficult a process it’s been. And actually not because the EU is being stubborn or anything, but it’s just if you become a third country, holding on to the benefits of membership is very difficult and involves a lot of political compromise and essentially Brexit was built on a dishonest narrative that has not proven to be true.

But that doesn’t mean that there’s not still a lot of Euroscepticism across the European Union. Whether that is in Italy, whether it is in Hungary, whether it is in Poland, whether it is in the Netherlands, whether it is in France. And so, I think the next five years for the European Union is going to be a very challenging one to actually reinforce solidarity and unity. Building a sort of a collective understanding of why union membership is so important and reassuring. Not just the future relationship with Britain but the future of the European Union over the next five years in terms of how we shape that. And the ambition behind that needs to be exciting and creates a sense of momentum that actually European Union membership means something in terms of standards, opportunities, protection, safety as well as providing a business platform obviously for growth.

IK: We talk a lot about the deal and getting a deal over the line. But it is still highly volatile. I presume no deal contingencies are still being worked on?

SC: They are. I brought a memo to Cabinet this week. For the first time we were actually talking about detailed preparations for the future relationship discussion, but also reinforcing the point that the intensive work that we’ve done particularly over the last twelve months for a no deal. That very much remains an act of preparation. I think it’s less likely now. I think we have moved from a debate around ‘Deal or No Deal’ a month ago to now probably a deal or something softer depending on the outcome of the next general election in the UK.

But having said that, there is still the possibility, although I think it’s now far less likely, that all of this could implode again. That there could be a hung parliament. That certain people could hold the balance of power and refuse to sign up to the current deal and then we are in difficult territory if that happens again. I think the more likely outcome is that either Boris Johnson wins this and pushes his deal through with a new majority. Or else he loses this election, there is a Prime Minister, presumably from the Labour Party, who will look for a very different type of Brexit. But certainly not propose leaving without a deal.

So, I think we are we’re in better territory than we’ve been. But again, there is still uncertainty and we’re still in the realm of preparing for multiple different scenarios. And it is still costing us a fortune to do it quite frankly.

Ireland and the new world order

There has been an immense amount of debate around what Brexit will mean for Ireland.  Copenhagen Economics did a body of work for the government, published in February, showing that under a worst case, WTO scenario, Irish GDP will fall by 7 per cent by 2030. More recently, the ESRI said that the economy will contract next year if no deal was reached, while the Irish Fiscal Advisory Council noted that Brexit could mean severe budgetary costs and an emerging deficit.

The more imminent it becomes, the more severe the shock appears.

However, there has been little debate about Ireland within Europe in a post-Brexit world, and the long-term structural relationship between Ireland and Britain. This is something Coveney was keen to discuss.

“I think that some of the commitments and promises here may not prove to be as straightforward as they’re being presented. I’m trying to be as diplomatic as I can on this.”

IK: If you just look to Ireland in this post Brexit world, our closest trading could be a significant competitor in terms of attracting foreign direct investment. If the UKcan do a decent deal with Europe, it might also do a deal with the US. This could impact upon Ireland. How do we protect against this?

SC: First of all, if a deal passes through the Commons, that is not the end of the Brexit debate. Whether we like it or no, we are going be talking about Brexit for years to come. So, what we’re trying to do at the moment is to get certainty around a withdrawal agreement. If it is with Prime Minister Boris Johnson after this election, then it will be more than likely the deal that was struck with him. If it is a different prime minister, well then we will put a new deal in place.

But I’m pretty confident that we will protect Irish interests. But that withdrawal agreement, if it gets ratified and if the UK leaves, will simply just deal with the four issues that are dealt with in the withdrawal agreement. The financial settlement issue with the UK, the citizens’ rights issues, which is more relevant actually to other EU countries than to Irish, because we have a common travel area arrangement with UK, it deals with the transition period which essentially puts a legal structure around the dialogue for a future relationship for the next one to three years, depending on whether the UK seeks more time than one year. And it deals with very complex Irish issues. But that’s just the divorce arrangement. You then have to negotiate a future relationship.

IK: But the UK will also be talking to Donald Trump and trying to a deal with the United States. Given that so much FDI comes from the US, that could impact Ireland.

SC: I think that some of the commitments and promises here may not prove to be as straightforward as they’re being presented. I’m trying to be as diplomatic as I can on this. The UK is going to have to decide where their priority lies from a trade perspective. Because if you’re going to have, and this is the aspiration in the political declaration, if you’re going to have tariff free, quota free trade with the EU, well then the EU is going to insist on a level playing field – conditions across multiple sectors. This is going to limit Britain’s aspirations for deregulation and for reshaping their economy in a way that moves away from EU regulation and standards.

And that is the aspiration of some in the UK to move away from the EU model to negotiate trade deals that are based on competitiveness and access to products that are not consistent with EU regulation. If you do that in Britain well then don’t expect tariff free, quota free trade into the EU because it won’t be happening. I think that there are trade-offs here that Britain will have to decide on. And if the EU, which is by far Britain’s largest trading partner, is going to be the priority in terms of a tariff free, quota free trade deal, well then the level playing field issues on working conditions, environment, animal husbandry, air quality, climate change, consumer protections, state aid rules all that stuff. If you’re going to trade, barrier free, into the EU there is no way the EU can accept a situation where the EU changes its regulatory model to create competitive advantage and then expects barrier free access into a market that they’ve just left in order to compete with companies that they previously would’ve shared a single market with. That would make no sense for the EU so.

So, I think that is going to be a difficult debate. From an Irish perspective we want the closest possible trading relationship with the UK. We have a €70 billion trading relationship with them. And we have 38,000 to 40,000 companies trading with the UK every fortnight or so.

“Britain has been an extraordinarily positive partner for Ireland – on taxation, on making the single market work, fighting against protectionism, on taking a globalised view on trade.”

IK: What are the main opportunities for Ireland, post Brexit, and what do we need to do policy wise to deal with it?

SC: I think there are significant opportunities for Ireland. I mean look, there’s a lot more downside than upside. So, let’s just be straight up about that.

But there are some opportunities. 50 per cent of foreign direct investment in the UK is targeting UK consumers. The other 50 per cent is using the UK as a platform for international trade predominantly into the EU single market. I think a lot of those investments that have focused on Britain as a platform into the EU will now look elsewhere. And I think Ireland has exciting opportunities to create gateways into the EU single market for companies that otherwise may have prioritised the UK.

But I think if we can have a future relationship that is as ambitious as we’d like it to be, then I think we can still have close to seamless trade with the UK. That can be tariff free and I hope quota free as well. But ultimately that’ll be a consequence of debate and discussion in the British Parliament and under negotiation with the EU.

The other factor that we’re now planning for is what does the EU look like without the UK. Even in a transition period. British ministers and a British prime minister are no longer around the negotiating table shaping EU policy. Britain has been an extraordinarily positive partner for Ireland – on taxation, on making the single market work, fighting against protectionism, on taking a globalised view on trade. All of those things have been very beneficial from an Irish perspective and from an Irish economic perspective.

“The Nordic Baltic grouping is quite a coherent group in terms of policy development and both ourselves and the Netherlands have now been quite active in terms of working with that group. And I think you’ll see a lot more of that.”

And we’re not going to have this giant in the room any longer. That is making the case for Ireland through British lobbying. This has been a big focus from us and people like Pascal Donohoe and the Taoiseach and myself and others have had a lot of discussion around where does Ireland fit in in an EU without Britain. In terms of lobbying, in terms of being an effective influencer on policy change and so on in some of the key areas for our economy.

And we’ve been quite active on building new alliances.

IK: Such as our new friends in the North.

SC: Yes. The Nordic Baltic grouping is quite a coherent group in terms of policy development and both ourselves and the Netherlands have now been quite active in terms of working with that group. And I think you’ll see a lot more of that. And then on certain issues, the relationship with Paris and Berlin is very strong from an Irish perspective now. And on certain issues, we have close alliances with other countries too whether it’s in the Mediterranean or elsewhere.

“Part of my agenda is not to undermine the leader of the country in order to take his job.”

Simon Coveney was the overwhelming choice of many grass roots members of Fine Gael to lead the party. But he failed to win the parliamentary party to his cause. I end by asking if he still harbours ambitions to lead the party and the country.

IK: Napoleon said that every soldier carries a marshal’s baton in his backpack. Do you still harbour some ambition or desire to be Taoiseach?

SC: That is not something that eats away at me. I’ve tried to be as influential as I can be on this government. I have a very good working relationship with the Taoiseach. I think he confides in me. We test each other and challenge each other a lot. And I think that’s hopefully a relationship that has benefited the country. Often after political leadership contests there’s bitterness on one side and a rewriting of history on the other side for the winner. I was determined that wouldn’t happen in Fine Gael this time. And I think Leo has responded also to that by giving me a lot of responsibility, almost autonomy, as well on a lot of big files.

So, my focus is on doing a really good job as Tánaiste and as deputy leader of the party. I’m happy doing that. And I mean who knows what the future holds. But certainly, part of my agenda is not to undermine the leader of the party and the leader of the country in order to take his job. I think I owe a lot of people a lot more than that. So, no, for me my focus is on doing as good a job as I can in the role that I’m in and keeping an open mind in terms what the future holds.