Michel Barnier has been around the block in politics. The 71-year-old member of the centre-right Republican party, aligned with Fine Gael in Europe, was a French MP, four-time minister under presidents Jacques Chirac and Nicolas Sarkozy and twice European commissioner before he led the EU’s Brexit negotiation team from 2016 to 2021. I previously reviewed the book he wrote about his gruelling years of talks with successive UK governments.

Last year, Barnier ran in his party’s primary for next April’s presidential election and came third. He now supports the contest’s winner, Valérie Pécresse, in taking on the incumbent Emmanuel Macron. I met him in Paris as the presidential campaign there heats up. But my first question was to get his reaction to the DUP’s recent decision to collapse the Northern Ireland executive in protest at the Protocol Barnier had agreed with the UK.

Michel Barnier (MB): The DUP being opposed to the precise contents of the Irish Protocol is not a surprise. It always was, even as the other political, economic and social forces in Northern Ireland have understood the importance and the interest of this Protocol, including the majority of political parties.

I won’t comment on the situation in the UK, whether it’s in Northern Ireland, Scotland or elsewhere. I never did, this wasn’t my role and it still isn’t. For four and a half years, I tried to find solutions to the problems posed by Brexit and nothing else. In Northern Ireland, what poses a problem is Brexit.

Without being naive, I thought that those who had triggered Brexit would want to find solutions to the problems posed by Brexit in Northern Ireland when it comes to preserving peace, avoiding a land border, protecting the all-Ireland economy and the European single market at the same time. We found how to square this circle first with Mrs May, with a protocol that didn’t work for the new Prime Minister Mr Johnson, and then with Mr Johnson, his government and his majority who ratified this Protocol.

I don’t have other comments to make on the internal situation in Northern Ireland. I wish the UK the best, including Northern Ireland. I hope a sustainable relationship can be established between the UK and the European Union.

This Protocol is what it is. It was negotiated line by line, comma by comma by Mr Johnson, his then ministers and the current civil servants. There are no surprises. This Protocol is the solution and it can be implemented in a pragmatic, operational, technical way if there is goodwill and good faith on both sides.

This Protocol won’t be renegotiated. Goodwill and good faith are needed and I hope the British government will understand that. 

I never mentioned a border – I spoke about checks and controls. I know how sensitive this question is and I respect that. We just need to check the live animals, animal and vegetal products and industrial products entering the single market. That was the key in this Protocol to avoid a land border.

Thomas Hubert (TH): As you said, the Protocol was negotiated line by line and it is detailed. The aim was to leave no room for subsequent negotiations. Yet a cycle of discussions is continuing between Liz Truss and Maroš Šefčovič. Was anything missing in the Protocol to leave it open to what seems to be a never-ending circle of discussions?

MB: Logically, no. It was always said that this Protocol was precise enough and, again, the British cannot say they are surprised because they negotiated, signed and ratified this text themselves. It leaves room for operational implementation and discussions, which I started and are now continued by Maroš Šefčovič with much competency, persistence and objectivity. I trust him and I met him recently in Brussels. 

But as you can see, the British or at least some British leaders don’t want to implement the Protocol. This is the issue. So they’re trying to re-open negotiations. Discussions should not be mistaken for negotiations. I don’t believe the European Union will accept any renegotiation. Yet on precise, concrete topics such as medicine shipments, the Protocol can be implemented with solutions that respect the spirit of the Protocol. I don’t think any negotiation is possible, but discussions are possible in good faith to reach operational solutions.

TH: You say you have recently met Maroš Šefčovič. Are you still involved in these discussions, in an advisory or other capacity?

MB: No, not at any point. I have closed this chapter at the agreed point after four and half years, which was a long enough negotiation on behalf of the European Union, once the two treaties were ratified. (…)

I continue to feel accountable on a personal level for what is happening because I feel strongly about peace in Ireland and the implementation of this agreement but I no longer have any responsibility for it.

De-dramatise checks and controls

TH: Without pre-empting the end of the discussions, can you see individual points that could end the ongoing discussions on the implementation of the Protocol? Or will they remain open on a permanent basis for the future?

MB: I don’t think this can remain open permanently. The British government will have to make a decision and the recently appointed new minister just has to respect the signature that was given. This is important for the European Union and for the credibility of the UK, for the credibility of its signature and its reputation. Above all, it is important for peace in Ireland.

Several times during the negotiation, I used the word “de-dramatise”. This issue can be solved in good faith on both sides if we de-dramatise checks and controls. If we dramatise and politicise them and turn them into ideology, then things can go wrong. Every point under discussion can find a technical solution. But there must be no land border to protect peace, and therefore we need checks and controls on what enters the single market.

TH: Coming back to what led to the Protocol, one important day I followed both live and in your book afterwards was October 10, 2019 when Leo Varadkar and Boris Johnson met in Liverpool. They agreed two moves that were mutual conditions of one another: Choose the protocol option keeping Northern Ireland in the single market; and call a snap election in the UK so that the government is no longer dependent on DUP support in its coalition. 

Retrospectively, one could not happen without the other. Can you tell us who came up with the idea of these two mutually dependent moves to unblock the situation? Did you suggest the simultaneous Northern Ireland Protocol and snap election? Did Leo Varadkar or Boris Johnson?

MB: I don’t think they can be described as two conditions. The European Union has no say and no decision in the organisation of snap elections in the UK. The British don’t need us to set their political agenda. Boris Johnson decided that. I think that he did need to demonstrate that he had delivered Brexit to wind that election.

TH: What he called the oven-ready deal.

MB: A deal he described as excellent, the best deal possible – we could collect all the comments he made and put them on the table. This has not changed, it is still a good, balanced and pragmatic deal. We looked for and found solutions to the problems posed by Brexit in Ireland and only those.

I don’t know exactly what was said in detail between Leo Varadkar and Boris Johnson. All I know is that former Taoiseach Leo Varadkar was extremely decisive in the evolution of Mr Johnson towards understanding that the EU 27 were full united – the 26 in solidarity with Ireland. We had told him so with Jean-Claude Juncker a few days earlier, and I think he understood that while listening to Leo Varadkar, who had a decisive role.

“Maybe the feeling I had was that those who thought this agreement was reasonable and good for Northern Ireland should express this more forcefully.”

TH: On the role of the Republic of Ireland and the Irish government, I noticed while reading your book that there is little detail about your relationship with the Republic. It is written as a diary and I noticed an entry that said: “I arrive in such country from Dublin…” but we don’t know what happened in the previous days, they are not detailed. Did you choose to keep this seemingly important relationship discreet? 

MB: I was in permanent contact with Leo Varadkar, with whom I got along well, with Simon Coveney, with the minister for European affairs [Helen McEntee], with the Taoiseach’s diplomatic advisor John [Callinan]. We worked in permanent coordination. I won’t discuss it now because I don’t have all conversations in my memory but I know my concern was that the 27 remained closely united and that we kept the Irish government well informed of what we were doing in the negotiations. The Irish were always informed of what we were doing in the negotiations because we were also negotiating in their name.

One important thing for you to understand as a young journalist is that unanimity is one of the reasons for unity among the 27, paradoxically. Unanimity usually comes in the way of going further. We tend to fall back on the smallest common denominator – I’m talking here about the normal life of the European Union when it comes to topics like tax, which we will talk about later. 

In the precise case of Brexit, the obligation to obtain unanimity in passing an agreement was key for unity among the 27 because each country in the Union could tell the other 26: I care about this issue, it must become yours too. This is what happened, I watched over that. Ireland was the most serious and evident case of this unity. The issue with Ireland was not trade, goods or technical control, it was peace. The 26 showed solidarity and, throughout the negotiation, the British had trouble understanding that every time they tried to drive a wedge in between our unity, they diminished the chance of an agreement. They didn’t achieve that.

TH: My final question about Brexit and Ireland concerns the unionist community. When I read your book, I felt the frustration in your relationship with the DUP and the lack of a Northern Ireland executive during the most part of the negotiations. But, conversely, I had the impression you lacked access to moderate unionists, which meant their point of view may not have been represented as strongly in the negotiations. Was that true?

MB: No, my door was always open. I went to Derry-Londonderry to meet the business community in Northern Ireland, I met elected representatives. Moderate unionist parties – as you say – visited me every time they were in Brussels. I had contacts with members of parliament, good people from those parties. I met with everyone. Maybe the feeling I had was that those who thought this agreement was reasonable and good for Northern Ireland should express this more forcefully. The DUP was always very vocal.

TH: From the Good Friday Agreement until today.

MB: It used its leverage on Mrs May a lot. Other parties, which by the way are the majority, found this agreement good for Northern Ireland because it really is and improves the lives of Northern Ireland’s people. Sometimes, I thought: They should say so more forcefully. I said this when I met the business community in Derry-Londonderry. But I did not feel I had insufficient contact with them.

Michel Barnier: “We’re going to fight for a real border carbon tax.” Photo: Thomas Hubert

TH: To link this with French news, something struck me when you ran in the Republican party’s primary election. After warning against the dangers of inward-looking attitudes connected with Brexit, one of the first promises you made was to stop immigration – something that is closer to this nationalistic wing of politics in France, too. Did you change your point of view or pivot when you came home on such identity issues?

MB: There should be no confusion here. Immigration in the context of Brexit in the UK is about freedom of movement.

TH: Inside the EU.

MB: Yes. This is not the same thing at all. I would never question the fundamental progress achieved by freedom of movement inside the European Union. I would never imagine that my country has any interest in leaving the EU or the single market. Immigration as we’re discussing in France is different: It is immigration from third countries, which nobody controls in Europe nor in France. Because nobody controls it, there are heavy tensions in some regions in France and the feeling of a flow that needs to be brought under control. 

I did not change my mind. When I ran in the presidential primary, I first tried to understand the problems facing my country and then to offer solutions. Some of them I hadn’t addressed before. In this case, we’re talking about immigration from third countries and the current French government, as well as left-leaning leaders such as [former Prime Minister] Mr Valls, as well as the Republican right, say nothing else: We must control immigration so that we can give a better welcome to those we do want to come here.

“When you look like France, you win; when you look like part of France, you lose.”

TH: Valérie Pécresse won the primary and we are now at her campaign HQ. What is your role in this campaign?

MB: I’m working with her on everything concerning international issues, Europe, external security, Francophonie and international trade – anything to do with France’s external action.

TH: Looking at the French political landscape leading up to the presidential election, can you define the position of Valérie Pécresse between Emmanuel Macron, who seems to have captured a pro-business, market-oriented centrist movement and the national right of Marine Le Pen and Eric Zemmour who claim to have first addressed immigration and other traditional right-wing issues?

MB: I’m not going to define our position with Valérie Pécresse as the candidate of the Republican centre-right in relation to others. We have our own convictions that came from the movement founded by Gen De Gaulle and we are proud of its beautiful, great history. Our place is very strong at the centre of the French political spectrum as a party that reflects the country in all its hues: There are people who are more national (I’m not saying nationalists), sometimes sovereignists, others are more liberal and progressive. This is our strength to represent all these. When you look like France, you win; when you look like part of France, you lose.

Mr Macron has a different strategy, which is to create a gulf between him and the far right. We don’t have to follow this tactic. I think it has been a major mistake on his part to theorise that there are progressives on one side and extremists on the other; the populists on one side and the Europeans on the other. This is not true. We, the European centre-right are here – the European Popular Party, to which Leo Varadkar’s party belongs. We are its main political party here in France and I don’t want to define it in relation to others. We are defined by the problems of the French people and the solutions we are offering. 

TH: Looking at France from an Irish point of view, it is now geographically the nearest entry point into the European Union, a huge market, an important partner on the Common Agricultural Policy…

MB: … and transport and energy.

TH: Exactly. So what would your candidate do differently for those in Ireland who are following these issues and watching France when it comes to EU policies on trade, energy and agriculture?

MB: We’re not going to cover all these issues in one sentence.

TH: Let’s pick one or two that stick out.

MB: I wrote a book that many in Ireland have read about the secrets of Brexit and the negotiation I led on behalf of the EU. The first chapter was called “A warning”. What we’re saying is, in the coming decade, and in the next five years when Valérie Pécresse is president if the French people want her to, let’s change Europe on a number of points where we can learn lessons. Brexit was an event that was unfortunately, first and foremost, of interest to the British. I’m saying unfortunately because I still haven’t understood the added value of Brexit. Yet it is of concern to us as well in other countries. 

“We want borders to be actual borders, with controls on all people getting in and out of Europe.”

There are lessons to be learned in terms of political control over what the Brussels administration does: Less naivety and more reciprocity in trade negotiations with Mercosur, New Zealand, Australia, for example. Considering agriculture, which is a powerful industry in Ireland and in France, it will take longer than six months, but we wish to include mirror clauses in trade agreements so that agricultural products entering the European single market respect the same environmental and other constraints we impose on our agricultural producers.

Let’s stop being naive by creating difficulties for our own producers while they’re competing with products coming in under those agreements with lower or sometimes non-existent standards. This is also why we’re going to fight for a real border carbon tax on industrial products entering our market without complying with the standards we impose on our own manufacturers. These are two examples of the changes that we want to introduce, though this will take longer than one presidential term.

When it comes to strengthening European investment in industries for the future such as chips and batteries, this is all positive and we support it. Jean-Claude Juncker started that trend with the Juncker Plan, which has been amplified through the Covid recovery plan. This is all going in the right direction. 

We want borders to be actual borders, with controls on all people getting in and out of Europe. This applies to all external EU borders. 

Finally, for those countries that want it, there are efforts to be made in co-operating for security and defence. 

TH: One issue in Europe has had Ireland at its centre for a long time and Nicolas Sarkozy was strongly engaged on it his time – corporation tax and the fact that the French centre-right wanted less tax competition and dumping between EU states, targeting Ireland. Is this still an important point in the Republican platform?

MB: Generally speaking, a number of French political parties, not only our own, consider that dumping is incompatible with the single market. This is not about questioning each country’s tax freedom, but about harmonising business and consumer taxation as much as possible inside the single market. I don’t find it normal that there are as many corporation tax bases – I mean bases, not rates – as there are countries, even as we are in the same single market and most of these countries have the same currency. We favour harmonisation – not necessarily upwards – and I think there are reasons to decide by qualified majority on this topic.

“Pollute less but produce more”

TH: The French president to be elected this year will oversee preparations for the next Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). There’s a lot of talk about the CAP that is starting now, but as it was delayed, it will be short and a lot of work will take place under the next French president on the following CAP. You were minister for agriculture. Do you have ideas that would change significantly the way agriculture is managed at the European level? (…)

MB: We want to maintain a great Common Agricultural Policy, which has been the number one EU policy since 1962 and is decided by qualified majority. We want to protect it in good co-operation with Ireland. We have always found a lot of common views and interests between French and Irish farmers. 

What we are worried about in the European Commission’s current orientation is the idea of agricultural degrowth – the idea that to pollute less, you should produce less. In my country, I have been minister for both the environment and, later, agriculture and I think that we must pollute less but produce more. This means that, as well as this production drive, we must intensify research and innovation efforts to give farmers the alternatives they need to pesticides.

This is the real issue. Our world will soon have 9 to 10 billion inhabitants and we need to feed those men and women. We must produce more. If we Europeans produce less, we give up one of our strategic industries and the Brazilians and Americans will immediately take our place. I can’t see why we would do this. The Americans, Brazilians and Chinese are not naive. We must stop being naive. The next CAP must be prepared with this approach of producing more and better.

TH: Final question – a more personal one. What role do you see for yourself in the next period? If your candidate wins the election, a role in government? Alternatively, a new EU executive will also need to be formed in 2024.

MB: Listen, frankly, I don’t have a career plan. I didn’t have one when I entered the presidential debate. I don’t need anyone to remind me of my age, I know it, even though I still have the same energy and ability for indignation and enthusiasm. I don’t have a career plan and I will see where I can be most useful to my country and to Europe.

Frankly, I won’t answer this question. I’m in a presidential campaign that is both very important and very difficult. I hope Valérie Pécresse will be the new president of the French Republic. She would be the first women to be French president. She is able for it, she is a modern and open-minded woman who speaks fluent English and Russian and a bit of Japanese. She believes in the European project as a major piece for France and for the stability of the continent. I’m working with her and we will see what happens next. She must get elected first.